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This paper evaluates as well as synthesizes the empirical studies results of the relationship 
between one mechanism of corporate governance and financial reporting quality (FRQ). The 
authors study one oversight mechanism that is ownership structure. For the mechanism, the 
authors recapitulate the links between variable monitoring effectiveness contribution and 
monitoring outcomes of FRQ namely earnings management (EM). The system arrangement 
affords synthesizing the empirical findings allegation, highlighting the mechanism of corporate 
governance role in improving FRQ. This probable synthesis inform regulators, board of directors 
and accountants who are apprehensive with enhancing the public and private corporations 
oversight in addition to decreasing managers and others the opportunities to engage in EM. The 
ownership structure components are insider managers, institutional investors, and block-holders 
that can improve the FRQ.  
 




While FRQ is not observable directly, famous observers stated that they know it as they 
see it; they also energetically emphasize the importance of FRQ as the same as a modern capital 
market foundation. Former chairman of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), Arthur Levitt said: “high quality accounting standards …improve liquidity and reduce 
capital costs” and claims that “quality information is the life blood of strong, vibrant markets. 
Without it, liquidity dries up. Fair and efficient markets cease to exist.” Easley and O‟Hara 
(2004) stated that capital market decrease premium financial reporting to enable investors reduce 
investment risks, lending sustain of conceptual to Levitt‟s declare. Furthermore, the Senate of 
Canada (2003, p. 2) said: “analysts generally agree that the financial scandals appearing almost 
daily for months in the media were the result of some combination of at least three factors: failed 
corporate governance; lax auditing and accounting standards and oversight; and the incentives, at 
times perverse, provided by executive compensation systems”.  
 
There is a shortage in consensus as to what FRQ constitutes. For example, Blue Ribbon 
Commission (BRC) (1999) and Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) (2002) required auditors to discuss 
the FRQ methods and acceptability. Jonas and Blanchet (2000, p. 353) stated that: “in light of 
these new requirements, auditors, audit committee members, and management are now 
struggling to define FRQ”. Rather than defining FRQ, prior literature review has focused on 
factors such as EM, financial restatements, and fraud that obviously curb the high FRQ 





achievement and have used the presence of these factors as proof of a breakdown in the process 
of financial reporting (Nichols & Wahlen, 2004; Barth et al., 2008). Thus far, the FRQ 
measurement has evaded the researchers and those interested to improve it.  
 
The main significant function of corporate governance is to increase the integrity of the FRQ 
process (Cohen et al., 2004). Watts and Zimmerman (1978, p.113) stated that: “one function of 
financial reporting is to constrain management to act in the shareholders‟ interest”. Investors 
needed additional accurate and comprehensive information for their decisions of investment due 
to rising the complication rising of today‟s business.  
 
In the early 21
st
 century, there were many corporate accounting scandals series in the United 
States of America (USA) and Europe. Examples included Enron, HealthSouth, Parmalat, Tyco, 
WorldCom and Xerox. The central issue of those scandals center was EM (Goncharov, 2005). 
EM has been concern of practitioners and controllers and has established substantial 
concentration in the literature of accounting (Loomis, 1999). EM has masked the accurate results 
of financial and businesses situation and has created ambiguous information that stakeholders be 
supposed to know (Loomis, 1999). 
 
The crisis of global market (2008) has enthused enormous research body on both corporate 
control and FRQ. Usually finance and management are separated inside corporations. Though, 
the action of separation pretenses two conflicts. First, suppliers of fund facade communal action 
problems stopping them to monitor and discipline the company managers they are investors of 
(Macey, 1998). Second, managers need to persuade market applicants of the performance of 
firm, to be capable of apportion sufficient funds for the investments of firm. As the investments 
value is tied to the firm, this value relies on the future predictions of the business relationship 
between the firm and its suppliers. As a result, the stakeholders‟ perception about the firm‟s 
future forecast influences their inducement to take on such investments. Therefore, researchers 
recommended that in order to persuade stakeholders; managers may engage in EM (Graham et 
al., 2005). 
 
The financial reporting scandals in USA and Europe corporations, which has previously been 
measured as the perfect model of financial reporting and regulation of capital market, has added 
to the defeat of investors‟ confidence in the direction of the accounting numbers truthfulness. 
This resulted in an important investment extraction from the securities market in 2001 and 2002 
(Saudagaran, 2003). Mutually these scandals with the Asian financial crisis 1997/1998 and the 
global market crisis of 2008 have strained deliberation to corporate governance improvements 
around the world and require improving the FRQ as long as the capital market requirements 
accurate and impartial financial reporting to securities value and encourage investors‟ 
confidence. 
 
The objective of this study is to analyze and synthesize the corporate oversight literature and its 
relationship with governance measures that are supposed to be linked with EM. The researchers 
inspect one mechanism of oversight – ownership structure component – that can add to the 
effective monitoring of companies‟ financial reporting. The researchers recapitulate and construe 





the results of USA and international empirical research examining the relationship among 
variables that can influence monitoring effectiveness.  
 
The financial reporting theme is of enormous value to all financial statements users in making 
their investment decisions. So, this distinctive categorization method offers a way of 
synthesizing the empirical findings implications in a coherent framework, stress the corporate 
governance role in improving EM. EM may have a negative effect on the earnings quality, which 
in sequence might misled shareholders, investors, creditors, regulators, tax authorities and all 
other users they may rely on manipulated accounting numbers. For example, tax authorities 
determine the taxable income based on accounting income, after some adjustments according to 
the tax law. If accounting income is manipulated, so are taxable income, and thus the tax amount. 
Additionally, financial institutions base their decisions to give credit partly on the performance 
of the borrower; if managed, earnings will misallocate funds among competing firms. This study 
will be vital to Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) that is concerned about EM and improving the 
FRQ.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The text section overviews of the background of the 
study. Literature Review section  summarizes the literature review. Corporate Governance 
Effectiveness section reports the corporate governance effectiveness. The Conceptual Model and 
Propositions Development section shows the conceptual model and propositions development. 
The finally Section summarizes and concludes this paper. 
 
 
Background of the Study 
 
Jordan is a stable nation, a moderate economy, as well as has comparatively sophisticated 
stock market. Yet, its economy is private segment slanting; the ownership state is quite small. 
Lately, a privatization series scheme has been put into practice to decrease government shares in 
the economy (Al-khabash & Al-Thuneibat, 2009). 
 
In Jordan all registered firms are subject to the certification responsibility and publishing their 
financial reporting. From 1987, Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA) 
is responsible for conducting the professional examination and monitoring the quality of 
financial report. It adopts International Accounting Standards (IAS) as a basis for preparing 
financial report. 
 
In 1978 the Amman Financial Market (AFM) was established. Thereafter, the Securities Law 
23/1997 was introduced as a process to transform Jordanian capital market. Three institutions 
emerged: the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), the ASE, and the Securities Depository 
Center (SDC). The ASE is the largest stock markets in the region that authorizes foreign 
investment. In 2008, market capitalization to GDP was about 226.3% and listed securities are 
trade in electronically.  
 
In accordance with the JSC Law (23/1997) and Directives of Disclosures, Auditing, and 
Accounting standards (1/1998), all listed companies are required to apply International Financial 





Reporting Standards (IFRS). These directives specify the information to be disclosed and filed 
with the Commission for enhancing transparency. Listing companies are also required to apply 
the International Auditing and Accounting Standards under the supervision of the JSC. A new 
Securities Law number 76/2002 has been issued, which authorizes setting up other stock 
exchanges and allowed forming an independent investor protection fund, stricter ethical and 
professional codes, and a more stringent observance of the rule of law (ASE, 2009). 
Additionally, the Accountancy Profession Law (APL) 73/2003 was issued. Important features of 
the APL include the establishment of a High Council for Accounting and Auditing, headed by 
the Minister of Industries and Trade and the creation of an improved JACPA.  
 
The above law evolvement shows that Jordan is a country in which investors rely on accounting 
information before making investment decisions. Thus, it is critical to consider the theme of EM 
in order to protect those investors from being misled (Al-Fayoumi, Abuzayed, & Alexander, 
2010). This study proposes a conceptual model to assess the merit of calling different types of 




 Earnings Management 
 
There are no compromises on the EM definition (Beneish, 2001). For example, Schipper 
(1989, p. 92), defined EM as: “the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles to bring about a desired level of reported income”. 
Healy and Wahlen (1999, P. 365) stated that: "earnings management occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting in structuring transactions to alter financial reports, to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting". EM is also defined as: “an 
intentional structuring of reporting or production/investment decisions around the bottom line 
impact” (Hui & Fatt, 2007, p. 196). 
 
A number of preceding studies investigated as to whether EM exist in firms reports (Healy, 
1985; DeAngelo et al., 1994; Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997), attempt to find out the EM types 
(Beneish, 2001; Sirgar & Utama, 2008), or the EM motives (Healy & Wahen, 1999). Factors 
similar to compensation of management incentives of contract (Dechow & Solan, 1991; Guidry 
et al., 1999), motivations of regulatory (Key, 1997), motivations of capital market (Teoh et al., 
1998), and incentives of external contract (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) have been observed to 
understand behavior of managers to EM. 
EM takes place in three ways namely, by the use of the certain revenue structuring and/or 
transactions of expense; the use of accounting procedures changes; and/or the use of accruals 
management (McNichols & Wilson, 1988; Schipper, 1989). Among these techniques of EM, 
accruals management is the most harmful to the accounting reports value because the investors 
are unconscious of the amount of accruals (Mitra & Rodrigue, 2002). Accrual can be defined like 
the difference between the earnings and cash flow from operating activities. Further, accruals can 
be classified into discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals 
are adjustments to cash flows selected by the managers whereas non-discretionary accruals are 





accounting adjustments to the firm‟s cash flows mandated by the accounting standard-setting 
bodies (Rao & Dandale, 2008). 
 
The difference between theoretical definitions and categorizations has shaped a lot of 
opportunities for the researchers to investigate the practices, motivations and consequences of 
EM. Several international studies (Xie et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2002, 2003; Kanagaretnam et 
al., 2003; Amat et al., 2003; Baralexis, 2004; Graham et al., 2005; Davidson et al., 2005; Othman 
& Zeghal, 2006; Roychowdhury, 2006) and national (Jordanian) studies (Qarran, 2005; Al-
Momani, 2006; Hamad, 2007; Al-khabash, & Al-Thuneibat, 2009; Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010) have 
concentrated on the EM problem. 
 
Xie et al. (2003) conducted a sample study of 282 USA firms via a model containing 
discretionary and non-discretionary total accruals components. Using both descriptive statistics 
and regression analysis, they originated that EM is less take place in companies as boards of 
directors comprise independent outside directors with experience of corporate. Correspondingly, 
banking audit committees members, investment, or corporate backgrounds negatively linked 
with the EM level. Moreover, a relationship among lower EM level and the boards of directors‟ 
frequency meeting as well as audit committees was found. 
 
Based on collected data by using questionnaires regarding 515 EM efforts from 253 auditors of 
experienced working in the USA of a big firms accounting offices, Nelson et al. (2002, 2003) 
reported that EM contain areas like revenue recognition, business combinations, intangibles, 
fixed assets, investments, and leases. On the other hand, the majority regularly recognized 
attempts EM were reserves. Various respondents‟ motivations were afforded, which include 
meeting analysts‟ estimates, stock market influencing, management-compensation contracts 
meeting goals, shareholders communicating economic information, and income smoothing or 
improving future income for different reasons. 
 
Based on audit reports examination of 35 listed companies in Spanish Stock Exchange, Amat et 
al. (2003) detailed several practices that might be competent like EM. Using descriptive 
statistics, extraordinary results analysis and financial statements notes, such performs 
incorporated the next: reserves expenses charged rather than counting them in the income 
statement, capitalization expense, inventory valuation system changing, depreciation methods 
accelerated, pension plans extraordinary fees, not reflecting stock options expenses, insufficient 
provisions, and earnings reduction as future losses. 
 
Based on modeling a exact accrual associated with loan loss provisions as well as use correlation 
and multivariate analysis, Kanagaretnam et al. (2003) scrutinized the bank mangers‟ objects in 
via loan loss provisions discretion in order to manage earnings, using a sample of 4,166 
observations of bank-quarter that include bank holding USA companies. Their finding offered 
evidence that banks managers with good existing performance and anticipated poor future 
performance will save future income by decreasing existing income during loan loss provisions. 
Likewise, banks with poor present performance and probable good future performance will 
borrow income from the future by rising present income during loan loss provisions. 





Additionally, job security is a significant EM motivation; the decisions of managers in order to 
manage earnings are prejudiced by the cost of borrowing incentive reducing. 
 
Based on collected data through distributing questionnaires for 100 independent accountants as 
well as 100 senior auditors in Greece, Baralexis (2004), used correlation analysis and x
2
, found 
that, EM is accomplished to a great level (25% of earnings pre-managed). Both it is practiced 
through GAAP deficiency advantage and also violating it. Also, the big companies exaggerate 
profit for the increasing outside financing purpose. In contrast, small companies minimize 
earnings for paying low taxes; as a result, the firm size persuades the manipulation direction and 
reasons. Finally, it was found that legitimate EM is further accepted than illegitimate. 
 
Based on a cross-sectional Australian companies sample of 434 for the ended year 2000, 
Davidson et al. (2005), studied the internal governance structures characteristics by using 
regressing discretionary accruals models on a set of internal governance factors (the board of 
directors, the audit committee, the internal audit function (IAF), and the external auditor choice) 
on EM effect. The results found that both boards and audit committees are significantly linked 
with a lower of EM.  Additionally, there was a negative relationship among the presence of an 
audit committee and EM. Also, IAF was significantly associated with EM decreased. Likewise, 
there was no relationship between Big4 and EM lower level. 
 
Based on surveying of more than 400 and interviewing with executives working in firms of USA 
in addition to using both descriptive statistics as well as correlation analysis, Graham et al. 
(2005), given confirmation that managers are interested in benchmarks earnings meeting and 
earnings manage in order to continue or add to stock price, to improve the management team of 
external reputation, and to converse future expansion predictions. Furthermore, they detailed that 
EM is accomplished during real actions economic for instance, delay of expenditures advertising, 
like manipulation throughout utilizing discretion within-GAAP similar to use the accrual 
management. 
 
Roychowdhury (2006) investigated EM during actual (operational) manipulation activities, as 
opposite to EM throughout accruals. Founded on a USA sample of 4,252 firms, it was revealed 
that managers develop earnings reported through via discounts of price to provisionally sales 
increasing, with overproduction engaging in order to report lesser costs of goods sold, and by 
decreasing discretionary expenditures to progress margins. 
 
Othman and Zeghal (2006) examined motivations of EM in both environments of Canadian and 
French. The sample was 1,674 Canadian and 1,470 French observations. Using correlation and 
regression analysis, they given proof that practices of EM in France are mainly associated to 
contractual debt and effective tax rates motivations. In contrast, incentives of market-related for 
instance initial public and subsequent equity offerings are tough in Canada, which reflect a 
dynamic capital market.  
 
Qarran (2005) studied the income smoothing phenomenon and the factors that affect the 
inclination of management toward income smoothing (company size, taxes disbursements to 
sales ratio, return on sales, capital intensity, company profitability, ratio of operating expenses to 





total expenses, ratio of general and administrative expenses to total assets, profitability of the 
individual share). She applied Eckel‟s model on a sample of 53 listed companies on ASE over 
the period 1996-2003. She found that income smoothing is widespread in manufacturing 
companies sector. The percentage of smoothing net income before tax was the highest (60.4%) 
after that smoothing net operating income (54.7%) and afterward by smoothing net income 
(43.4%). 
 
Al-Momani (2006) studied the exploiting the flexibility level available in accounting standards 
by Jordanian companies during applying the modified Jones model (1991) on 70 listed 
companies in ASE over the period 1997-2003. Using regression analysis, t-test, and ANOVA, he 
found that the majority managers engage in EM by exploiting that flexibility, the banking sector 
was the highest in EM engaging while, the lowest was insurance sector. Furthermore, the 
following significant relationships were found: a positive relationship among the company 
profitability and EM on all sectors excepting banking sector, a negative relationship amid cash 
flow from operation (CFO) and EM on all sectors, as well as a negative relationship between the 
audit report liquidity and type and EM on the industrial sector. 
 
Hamad (2007) studied the income smoothing effect on market return of both service and 
manufacturing companies sector listed in ASE. Based on a sample of 44 manufacturing and 24 
service companies, in addition to using regression, t-test, and x
2
 analysis methods, she found that 
these companies are practicing income smoothing. Also, there was no effect by the sector type 
on income smoothing implementation except for using gross profit as income measure. 
Furthermore, the company size found no impact on income smoothing except for when an 
average sale is used as a size proxy and testing mutually the sectors. Additionally, an important 
income smoothing statistical effect has been found on market returns. 
 
Al-khabash, & Al-Thuneibat (2009) provided evidence regarding the EM existence from the 
external and internal auditors‟ perspective in Jordan. A particularly designed questionnaire was 
dispersed to a sample of both external and internal auditors. Using t-tests and ANOVA, they 
showed that external auditors supposed that significantly management engages only in legitimate 
EM that either increases or decreases income. On the other hand, internal auditors supposed that 
management engages in legitimate EM practices that only increase income. In both cases, there 
was important dissimilarity amid their opinions. There is no significant differentiation among 
large and small companies concerning EM practices. Nevertheless, the internal governance 
structure characteristics have a major consequence on illegitimate EM, while no major effect was 
found on legitimate EM.  
 
Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) studied the association amid ownership structure and EM for Jordanian 
industrial sample firms throughout 2001-2005 periods. EM is measured through discretionary 
accruals, while ownership structure by insiders, institutions and block-holders. Using the 
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM), the results showed that insiders' ownership is 
significant and positively affect EM. Additionally, found insignificant institutions and block-
holders in monitoring EM managerial behavior. Their conclusion have significant policy 
insinuations in view of the fact that they supported encouraging applying principles of corporate 
governance to stimulate institutions and block-holders to afford effective monitoring of 









Corporate Governance Effectiveness 
 
Adrian Cadbury defined the aims of corporate governance as: “The corporate governance 
framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require 
accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the 
interests of individuals, corporations and society” (Cadbury, 2002, p.13). 
 
Additionally, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defined 
corporate governance as “The system by which business corporations are directed and 
controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions 
on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company 
objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance” 
(OECD, April 1999). 
 
The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations can give rise to the potential for 
conflicts of interest between owners and their agents who manage the day-to-day operation of the 
company. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managers (the agent) act on behalf of the 
shareholders (the principal), who are the actual owners of the firm. This relationship empowers 
the managers‟ position and leaves the firm‟s shareholders with no control over the decision-
making processes. 
 
Jiraporn et al. (2008) argued that firms that are more informationally opaque may engage in more 
EM because a higher degree of asymmetric information makes it more difficult for shareholders 
to monitor managers. Thus, in the absence of effective control procedures within the firm, 
managers are more likely to take decisions that deviate from the interests of shareholders. As a 
result, managers may be better able to abuse their discretion over earnings, such as engaging in 
EM, thereby increasing agency costs. Hence it is argued by Fama and Jensen (1983) that firms 
need a system that can separate decision management from decision control in order to limit 
agency costs. Corporate governance can provide this desirable system or at least part of it. Such a 
system limits the power of management to disregard the interests of shareholders, thereby 
decreasing agency costs. This claim is also documented by Fama, (1980), Fama and Jensen, 
(1983) and Williamson (1988). These studies argued that corporate governance mechanisms 
constrain managerial opportunism. According to Hart (1995), a major part of corporate 
governance is designing checks and balances on opportunistic behavior by managers. 
 
Over the last two decades, large and growing consideration has been given to the importance of 
different corporate governance mechanisms for monitoring managers‟ discretion, including their 
discretionary financial reporting. Investors and regulators believe strongly that corporate 
governance mechanisms such as independent directors on the board and audit committees help to 





protect the shareholders‟ interests and alleviate any conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers. For example, the former United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
chairman recommended that the SEC needs to pay more attention to the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms on financial reporting (Levitt, 1998). 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) suggested that corporate governance should impact on 
shareholders‟ perception of the information content of accounting earnings. Accordingly, in 
order to constrain any divergence in interests and to ensure appropriate accountability of 
resources, an organization needs a comprehensive structure of controls that encourages efficient 
performance and responsible behavior. Corporate governance is used to deter any conflict of 
interests between shareholders and managers that may result in EM behavior causing a reduction 
in shareholder wealth. 
 
Cohen, et al (2002, p.587) recognized that: “…one of the most important functions that corporate 
governance can play is in ensuring the quality of the financial reporting process”. Thus, effective 
oversight of the financial reporting process by the aforementioned monitoring mechanisms is 
thought to improve the accuracy of reports to shareholders and act as a deterrent against possible 
opportunistic behavior by managers. 
 
EM is likely to reduce the FRQ and its usefulness for investment decisions, therefore, reducing 
investor confidence in the financial reports. On the other hand, accounting earnings are more 
reliable and of higher quality as opportunistic behavior of managers is reduced through using 
monitoring systems (Wild, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996). Thus, stock market regulators and other 
investor protection agencies are concerned about EM, especially after the collapse of several 
large firms in recent decades and they have responded through enhancing corporate governance. 
 
One vital monitoring system is corporate governance. Its primary objective is directly improve 
corporate performance and resolve agency problems through aligning the interest of management 
with the interests of shareholders (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Gul and Tsui (2001) supported the 
corporate governance effectiveness as a monitoring system. Among others, Xie et al. (2003) and 
Klein (2002) showed that corporate governance reduces the ability of management to manage 
earnings. 
 
With globalization of business and financial markets, there has been strong demand for FRQ 
from firms across countries so that investors can conduct comparative evaluation of risk and 
return of firms in different countries (Jaggi & Leung, 2007). Consequently, regulators in several 
countries outside the USA also started paying attention to corporate governance, in particular 
ownership structure components (insider managers, institutional investors, and block-holders) to 
improve the FRQ (Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010). In short, corporate governance therefore assists 
investors by aligning the objectives of management with the objectives of shareholders, thereby 
enhancing the financial information reliability and the financial reporting process integrity 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). 
The Conceptual Model and Propositions Development 
  





The following conceptual model is developed to investigate the association between ownership 
structure and EM. The diagram for the conceptual model is illustrated in Figure 1. In this 
conceptual model, ownership structure and EM are independent and dependent variables 
respectively. The present study thus attempts to bridge the gap through providing a basis for a 
comprehensive and perceptive discernment of the impact of ownership structure on EM. 
Although the causal relationships among the constructs shown in Figure 1 seem to be 
straightforward, to our knowledge, the present study is the only one that investigates the 
relationship between ownership structure and FRQ. In order to make practical statements about 
ownership structure and its associations with EM, the model requires further analysis. 
 













             
           Figure 1: Ownership Structure and Earning Management 
 
 Propositions between ownership structure and earning management 
 
Ownership structure as proposed by the agency theory is one of the most important corporate 
governance mechanisms to solve agency problems and suggests that concentrated ownership will 
result in more effective monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Whilst researchers in developed 
countries focus on the conflict of interest among outside shareholders and managers in a diffused 
ownership, in Asia where ownership concentration structures are more common the agency 
problem shifts to conflicts amongst the controlling owners and the minority shareholders 
(Claessens & Fan, 2002). The concentrated ownership creates agency conflicts between 
controlling owners and minority shareholders, which are hard to mitigate during the traditional 
functions of a board of directors. 
 
The ownership tightness allows self-interested behavior of managers to go unchallenged, 
internally through the board of directors and externally through takeover markets, as the 
controlling owners, who are often also the managers, gain effective control of a corporation and 
have the power to determine how the company is run and may expropriate the minority 
shareholders‟ wealth. Thus, the ownership structure of a company could be of critical importance 

















It is argued that an effective mechanism to constrain EM is the development of an appropriate 
ownership structure. 
 
There are two streams of thought regarding an effective structure of ownership. First, insiders or 
managers of the firm act also as shareholders if they acquire a considerable portion of the entity‟s 
shares, and this is deemed to be useful in reducing agency conflicts and aligning the interests of 
management and shareholders. Secondly, outsiders who own a significant number of the firm‟s 
shares, have more power and more incentive to monitor management activity, mainly the process 
of financial reporting, thus reducing the EM probability. 
 
Jordan ownership appears to be less highly concentrated than in many emerging markets; 
average free float is about 40 percent. This figure includes blocks of about 5 percent that may be 
part of the majority group and are held separately or indirectly. Family-owned business groups, 
centered on the bank, and including insurance, industrial, and tourism firms, are typical. The 
main listed companies are controlled by about 30 percent of the shares, which is usually 
reinforced by cross-shareholdings and inter-locking directorships. In addition, around 70 firms 
are controlled by a super-majority, indicating that consent of minority shareholders is not 
required for fundamental decisions. So far, institutional investors play no significant role and 
foreign ownership, mostly from Arab countries, accounted for around 40 percent of market 
capitalization (Financial Standards Report, 2009). 
 
This section illustrates three types of ownership, internal ownership by managers, external 
ownership by institutional investors and ownership by block-holders to reduce EM. The 
discussion includes pertinent previous studies on the effectiveness of these ownership structures 





Koh (2003) investigated Australian firms in relation to the relationship between managerial 
ownership and aggressive EM practice and found a positive association between them. This 
result is consistent with the view that high managerial ownership encourages managerial accruals 
discretion. 
 
Hsu and Koh (2005) extended Koh‟s (2003) research by investigating the effect of both short-
term and long-term managerial ownership on the extent of EM in Australia. They found that 
managerial ownership is statistically significant for all linear specifications but insignificant for 
the non-linear models. However, managerial ownership is positively associated with income-
decreasing discretionary accruals and negatively associated with income-increasing accruals. 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) supported this by saying that the more closely a CEO‟s 
compensation is tied to the value of stock and options, the more likely it is that discretionary 
accruals will be used to manipulate profits. 
 
Teshima and Shuto (2008) examined the managerial ownership effect on EM and found that EM 
is significantly positive within intermediate regions of ownership, which suggested that the 





entrenchment effect is dominant in these regions. Also, they found that the association between 
managerial ownership and EM is significantly negative within low and high regions of 
ownership, suggesting that the alignment effect is dominant in these regions. 
 
The above studies suggested that monitoring seems to be weaker at higher managerial ownership 
levels and, therefore, a positive relationship is documented between the managerial ownership 
and EM. In the UK context, Peasnell et al. (2005) studied this relationship by hypothesizing that 
the constraining relationship between EM, on the one hand, and an independent board of 
directors and the audit committee existence, on the other hand, will be more pronounced when 
the level of managerial share ownership is low. They did not document a direct association 
between managerial ownership and EM. On the other hand, they found little support for these 
conjectures, suggesting that boards continue to have a constraining influence on EM, even when 
shareholders and managers interests are better aligned. Laux and Laux (2009) examined the 
board of directors‟ equilibrium strategies for setting CEO incentive compensation and overseeing 
financial reporting and the effects of these on EM by using UK data. The results showed that an 
increase in CEO equity incentives does not necessarily increase EM because of the directors 
adjusting their oversight effort in response to a change in CEO incentives. 
 
However, there are few studies that argued the high managerial ownership is an effective 
governance device that results in reducing EM. Warfield et al. (1995) uncovered that the 
magnitude of accounting accrual adjustments is significantly higher when managerial ownership 
is low. Specifically, the absolute value of accrual adjustments is twice as high when managerial 
ownership is under 5 percent than when managerial ownership is above 45 percent. There are at 
least two plausible explanations for Warfield et al. (1995) contradictory result. First, they 
measured non-discretionary accruals as the five-year average of previous period accruals 
whereas other studies measured the discretionary accruals using models based on Jones (1991). 
The difference in the dependent variable measured is significant as they reported a mean of 
absolute discretionary accruals of 26%, which is much higher than that reported in the previously 
discussed studies, for example 7% in Koh (2003), 0.006% in Hsu and Koh (2005) and 3% in 
Teshima and Shuto (2008). The second plausible explanation is that Warfield et al. (1995) did 
not control for institutional ownership, which may be a correlated omitted variable in ownership 
and EM research.  
 
In addition, Klein (2002) examined the effectiveness of the board and the composition of the 
audit committee on earnings manipulation. She found inconclusive results that showed positive 
in two out of five models at 0.10 p-values. Given the impact that managerial ownership is likely 
to have on EM, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 





The preceding literature illustrates that institutional investors can be considered as sophisticated 
investors who typically serve a monitoring role in reducing pressures for myopic behavior. For 
instance, Bushee (1998) investigated as to whether institutional investors create or reduce 





incentives for corporate managers to reduce investment in research and development (R&D) to 
meet short-term earnings goals. The results indicated that managers were less likely to cut R&D 
to reverse earning decline when institutional ownership is high. 
 
It is a global view that institutional investor involvement in corporate governance is a 
complementary to corporate governance mechanism. Ferreira and Matos (2008) investigated the 
institutional investors‟ role around the world using a comprehensive data set of equity holdings 
from 27 countries. The results showed that firms with higher ownership through foreign and 
independent institutions have higher firm value, higher operating performance and lower capital 
expenditures. 
 
Institutional investors were classified into two main groups by recent studies. Firstly, long-term 
institutional investor who invest in firms with the intention of holding their ownership stake over 
a long period. Therefore, they have strong incentives to monitor those firms. Secondly, short-
term oriented institutional shareholders or as some studies referred them as myopic or transient 
institutional investors. This group of investors is dominant and they focus mainly on current 
earnings rather than long-term earnings in determining stock prices (Bushee, 2001). They engage 
less in the management monitoring process and, if they are unhappy with the firm‟s results, 
prefer to sell their stakes rather than to monitor or remove inefficient managers (Coffee, 1991). 
 
Bushee (2001) provided a method for classifying institutional ownership into short-term holdings 
and long-term holdings based on portfolio turnover and engagement in momentum trading. 
Latest studies use the level of institutional ownership and average percent of outstanding shares 
that are owned by institutional investors (Koh, 2003). Previous studies showed that short-term 
and long-term institutional holdings have opposite effects on EM. While long-term institutional 
holdings have a significant negative effect on the level of EM, short-term institutional holdings 
have a positive effect. Bushee (2001) stated that the characteristics of institutional investors 
should be considered when examining the relationship between institutional investors and EM. 
 
Bushee (2001) examined different effects of institutional non-block-holders and active 
institutional block-holders on EM behavior. He proposed that institutional non-block-holders are 
more interested in short-run performance than are institutional block-holders and that this interest 
creates pressure on management to deliver high earnings. On the other hand, Cheng and Reitenga 
(2009) found that active institutional block-holders exercise their monitoring power only when 
there is a pressure to increase earnings. But when there is strong pressure to decrease earnings, 
the effect of active institutional block-holders is inconclusive. This suggests that active 
institutional block-holders are conservative since they appear to be more likely to limit income-
increasing accruals than income-decreasing accruals. 
 
Charitou et al. (2007) examined the earnings behavior of managers during the distressed period. 
The results showed that the management of distressed firms with lower (higher) institutional 
ownership have greater (lesser) tendency to manage earnings downwards. In Australia, Koh 
(2003) found that the relationship between institutional ownership and aggressive EM was 
positive at lower level of institutional ownership and negative at higher level of institutional 





ownership. This is consistent with the view that monitoring by long-term institutional investors 
limits managerial accruals discretion. 
 
Hsu and Koh (2005) extended Koh‟s (2003) research by investigating the effect of both short-
term and long-term institutional ownerships on the extent of income-increasing and income-
decreasing EM. It is found that managerial ownership is statistically significant for all linear 
specifications but insignificant for the non-linear models. Their results suggested that transient 
and long-term institutional investors co-exist and have differential effects on EM. Transient 
institutions are associated with upward accruals management while long-term institutions 
constrain this activity. 
 
Osma and Noguer (2007) tested whether corporate governance mechanisms are effective in 
constraining EM. They found that key constraint of EM is institutional directors, unlike the UK 
and USA where independent directors play a significant role. Cheng and Reitenga (2009) 
examined the differential effects of institutional non-block-holders and active institutional block-
holders on EM and found that active institutional block-holders need to exercise their monitoring 
power only when there is pressure to increase earnings. But when there is strong pressure to 
decrease earnings, the evidence regarding the effect of active institutional block-holders is 
inconclusive. This may suggested that active institutional block-holders are conservative since 
they appear to be more likely to limit income-increasing accruals than they are to limit income-
decreasing EM. Cheng and Reitenga (2009) also asserted that the institutional investors‟ 
characteristics should be considered when examining the relationship between institutional 
investors and EM. 
 
Chung et al. (2002) investigated the relationship between institutional ownership and EM 
practice and found significant relationship between institutional investors and EM. Peasnell et al. 
(2005) supported this by saying that there is no relationship exists between institutional investors 
and EM. 
 
From the previous studies, it can be seen that institutional shareholders with a high ownership 
stake can play a significant role in monitoring and mitigating management opportunistic 
behavior such as EM. This seems not to happen when the institutional ownership stake is low. In 
Jordan, most institutional owners are social security institution (government pension funds) and 
financial firms. There is no existence of developed mutual funds or investment companies. As a 
result, institutional investors in Jordan are not effective in constraining managerial behavior of 
EM. Consistent with the argument that institutional investors in Jordan are short-term oriented 
and create incentives for managers of their portfolio firms to manage earnings aggressively, these 
institutional investors focus excessively on current earnings performance (Koh, 2003). Based on 
this phenomenon the following hypothesis proposes: 










Block-holders‟ ownership takes various forms including individual investors, pension funds, 
mutual funds, corporations, private equity firms, fund managers, banks and trusts. All these, 
except individual investors, are also known as „institutional investors‟ (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 
2009). 
 
Zhong et al. (2007) considered two competing views when studying the relationship between 
block-holders and EM. First, consistent with the agency theory perspective, small block-holders 
can sell their stocks quickly if they are not pleased with the performance of managers, whereas 
large block-holders found it hard to sell a large block of stock without it having considerable 
impact on the firm, including lowering its stock price. Thus, large block-holders normally adopt 
a long-term strategy and thus they need to monitor managers to produce more benefits for their 
equity ownership. Block-holders have the ability to monitor and „voice‟ their concerns and 
objections as a result of their large voting rights. This, in turn, provides some monitoring over 
managers, which enables the block-holder to also affect the board of directors‟ composition 
(Person, 2006). 
 
Secondly, unlike small shareholders, large block-holders can put pressure on managers to report 
a favorable financial performance and create another threat of intervention to perceived 
underperforming management (Barclay & Holderness, 1991; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Consequently, the existence of large block-holders may press firms' managers to engage in 
income-increasing EM to report a favorable financial performance. 
 
Bethel et al. (1998) found that block trades have a positive association with more management 
turnovers and found that block-holders press the managers to take specific actions or face risk of 
being dismissed whenever the company performs badly. These two competing views of the 
effect of block-holder ownership are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The dominating factor 
in both views is the cost and benefit of the EM to the block-holders.  
 
Zhong et al. (2007) examined the above two views on the effect of block-holders on EM. The 
sample was 5,475 firms that were observed between 1994 and 2003. EM was measured using 
pooled cross-sectional data and they used the modified Jones (1991) model. The results were 
consistent with the second view, which indicate that block-holder ownership is positively 
associated with discretionary accruals. 
 
Additionally, Klein (2002) examined the effectiveness of characteristics of the board and the 
composition of the audit committee, while controlling the effects of block-holders‟ ownership. 
To measure the effect of block-holders on EM, she looked at firms whose audit committees 
included representatives of block-holders with more than 5% of the equity. She found a negative 
relationship between 5% block-holders sitting on audit committees and EM. The limitation 
regarding this test is that the block-holder measurement in her study included only block-holders 
who sit on the audit committee and discriminated the effect of external block-holders. Her result 
might have been driven through the independence of the directors on the audit committees, 
regardless of their block ownership. 
 





Dempsey et al. (1993) divided their sample of owner-controlled firms into two types: owner-
managed firms in which managers own a substantial block of equity, and externally-controlled-
firms where outside block-holders own a substantial block of equity. They found that owner-
managed firms have less income-increasing EM compared to externally-controlled firms, which 
suggested that insider block-holders have more effective governance, attributed to reduce EM, 
than outside or external block-holders. One limitation of Dempsey et al. (1993) is the 
measurement of dependent variable (EM). They used one particular type of accounting choice, 
namely, extraordinary item reporting, and this may not capture the extent of EM as managers 
usually use a variety of methods to manage earnings and these can be more elusive than 
extraordinary items. 
 
Dechow et al. (1996) examined firms that were charged by the SEC with earnings 
overstatements that violate GAAP. They found a negative relationship between outside block-
holders and earnings overstatements that violate GAAP. In the UK, Peasnell et al. (2005) found 
that no relationship exists between block-holders and EM. 
 
Wang (2006) examined the relationship between the incidence of fraud and the presence of 
block-holders. The results showed that larger block ownership is associated with a higher 
probability of fraud detection and a propensity to commit fraud. In particular, she found that a 
10% increase in block-holder ownership tended to decrease the probability of fraud by 3.8%. 
This result suggests that block-holders play an important role in protecting FRQ. 
 
On the other hand, large shareholders may expropriate other investors and stakeholders by 
colluding with management, as documented by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Claessens et al. 
(2000) argued that concentrated ownership enables block-holders to use accounting information 
to their own advantage, for instance through income–decreasing devices to diminish the other 
shareholders‟ residual claims. 
 
Even if large shareholders monitor managers‟ behavior to some extent, there is a possibility that 
they expropriated minority shareholders by hiding the firm‟s real performance. This ownership 
concentration may also badly affect minority shareholders and in turn negatively affects the 
future value of the firm (Bebchuk, 1994). Moreover, there is empirical evidence that 
concentrated ownership (one ultimate owner) is one of the main causes of Asian companies‟ 
poor governance practice and poor accounting disclosure (Claenssens et al., 2000). 
 
Yu (2008) used large shareholders and the percentage of size of the largest block of stock and 
tested their association with EM. It is found that the EM level of a firm with large shareholders is 
higher than that of a firm without large shareholders by 17% of the sample mean and by 30% of 
the sample median. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3: A block-holding of 5% or more in a firm is negatively related to earning management among 
Jordanian listed companies. 
 







Summary and Conclusion 
 
In general, the governance and EM literature suggested that ownership structures affect 
the financial reporting credibility. In relation to managerial ownership, most of previous studies 
suggested that low managerial ownership is a good governance attribute, and this is opposite to 
the proposition of agency theory. However, the review of the results indicated that high 
institutional ownership is associated with less EM and thus in accordance with agency theory. 
The review of the previous studies of the association between block-holders‟ ownership and EM 
show inconclusive results. Some results suggest that block-holders may behave in aggressive 
manner and collude with managers against the shareholders‟ interests. Several researchers are 
not agree with this statement but this may be based on their market and their ownership stake. 
This study is pursued as an attempt to investigate the role of ownership structure on EM from the 
perspective of Jordanian listed companies. The study serves as a wake-up call for a motion to 
establish accountable management board.  It does raise concerns as to whether the best practice 
of corporate governance mechanisms, as stipulated by the Western world, is applicable to the 
Jordan business environment or not. As emerging economies exhibit different governance 
structures as a result of different institutional environments, there is a need to revise UK and 








Al-Fayoumi, N., Abuzayed, B., & Alexander, D. (2010). Ownership Structure and Earnings Management 
in Emerging Markets: The Case of Jordan. International Research Journal of Finance and 
Economics, 38. 
Al-khabash, A. A., & Al-Thuneibat, A. A. (2009). Earnings management practices from the perspective 
of external and internal auditors: Evidence from Jordan. Managerial Auditing Journal, 24(1), 58-
80. 
Amat, O., Perramon, J., Oliveras, E., & Empresa, U. P. F. D. d. E. i. (2003). Earnings Management in 
Spain: Some Evidence from Companies Quoted in the Spanish Stock Exchange: Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra. 
Al-Momani, M.A. (2006). The study and evaluation of the flexibility available in accounting standards 
used by mangers for earnings management practice and its understanding by investors: an 
empirical study, unpublished doctoral dissertation. Amman Arab University for Graduate Studies, 
Amman. 
Amman stock Exchange Web Site (2009). URL: http:// www. exchange.jo. 
Baralexis, S. (2004). Creative accounting in small advancing countries: The Greek case. Managerial 
Auditing Journal, 19(3), 440-461. 
Barclay, M. J., & Holderness, C. G. (1991). Negotiated block trades and corporate control. Journal of 
finance, 25, 861-878. 
Barth, M. E., Landsman, W. R., & Lang, M. H. (2008). International accounting standards and accounting 
quality. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3), 467-498. 





Bebchuk, L. A. (1994). Efficient and inefficient sales of corporate control. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 109(4), 957-994. 
Beneish, M. D. (2001). Earnings management: A perspective. Managerial Finance, 27(12), 3-17. 
Bergstresser, D., & Philippon, T. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 80(3), 511-529. 
Bethel, J. E., Liebeskind, J. P., & Opler, T. (1998). Block share purchases and corporate performance. The 
Journal of Finance, 53(2), 605-634. 
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC) (1999), 
Report and Recommendations of Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Audit Committees, New York and Washington, DC, NYSE and NASD. 
Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. 
Journal of accounting and economics, 24(1), 99-126. 
Bushee, B. J. (1998). The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. 
Accounting Review, 73, 305-333. 
Bushee, B. J. (2001). Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run Value? 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 18(2), 207-246. 
Cadbury, A. (2002). Corporate Governance and Chairmanship, A Personal View. Oxford Press. 
Charitou, A., Lambertides, N., & Trigeorgis, L. (2007). Earnings behaviour of financially distressed 
firms: the role of institutional ownership. Abacus, 43(3), 271-296. 
Cheng, C. S. A., & Reitenga, A. (2009). Characteristics of institutional investors and discretionary 
accruals. International Journal of Accounting and Information Management, 17(1), 5-26. 
Chung, R., Firth, M., & Kim, J. B. (2002). Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings 
management. Journal of corporate finance, 8(1), 29-48. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East 
Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2), 81-112. 
Claessens, S., & Fan, J. P. H. (2002). Corporate governance in Asia: A survey. International Review of 
Finance, 3(2), 71-103. 
Coffee Jr, J. C. (1991). Liquidity versus control: The institutional investor as corporate monitor. 
Columbia Law Review, 91, 1277-1366. 
Cohen, J., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. (2004). The corporate governance mosaic and financial 
reporting quality. Journal of Accounting Literature, 23(1), 87-152. 
Cohen, J., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. M. (2002). Corporate governance and the audit process. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 19(4), 573-594. 
Cronqvist, H., & Fahlenbrach, R. (2009). Large shareholders and corporate policies. Review of Financial 
Studies, 22(10), 3941-3976. 
Davidson, R., Goodwin‐Stewart, J., & Kent, P. (2005). Internal governance structures and earnings 
management. Accounting & Finance, 45(2), 241-267. 
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Skinner, D. J. (1994). Accounting choice in troubled companies. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 17(1-2), 113-143. 
Dechow, P. M., & Sloan, R. G. (1991). Executive incentives and the horizon problem:: An empirical 
investigation. Journal of accounting and economics, 14(1), 51-89. 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings 
manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 13(1), 1-36. 
Dempsey, S. J., Hunt III, H. G., & Schroeder, N. W. (1993). Earnings management and corporate 
ownership structure: An examination of extraordinary item reporting. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 20(4), 479-500. 
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985). The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences. The 
Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), 1155-1177. 





Easley, D., & O'hara, M. (2004). Information and the cost of capital. Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1553-
1583. 
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. The Journal of Political Economy, 88, 
288-307. 
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26, 301-325. 
Ferreira, M. A., & Matos, P. (2008). The colors of investors' money: The role of institutional investors 
around the world. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3), 499-533. 
Financial Standards Report, Jordan (2009). URL:http://www.estandardsforum.org. 
Goncharov, I. (2005). Earnings management and its determinants: Closing gaps in empirical accounting 
research: Peter Lang. 
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial 
reporting. Journal of accounting and economics, 40(1-3), 3-73. 
Guidry, F., J Leone, A., & Rock, S. (1999). Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management by 
business-unit managers. Journal of accounting and economics, 26(1-3), 113-142. 
Gul, F. A., & Tsui, J. S. L. (2001). Free cash flow, debt monitoring, and audit pricing: Further evidence 
on the role of director equity ownership. Auditing, 20(2), 71-84. 
Hamad, A.K. (2007). The effect of the income smoothing on the market return of listed companies in 
Amman Stock Exchange, unpublished Master‟ thesis' University of Jordan, Amman. 
Hart, O. (1995). Corporate governance: some theory and implications. The Economic Journal, 105(430), 
678-689. 
Healy, P., & Wahlen, J. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for 
standard setting. Accounting Horizons, 13(14), 365-383. 
Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 7(1-3), 85-107. 
Hsu, G. C. M., & Koh, P. S. (2005). Does the presence of institutional investors influence accruals 
management? Evidence from Australia. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(6), 
809-823. 
Hui, L. T., & Fatt, Q. K. (2007). Strategic organizational conditions for risks reduction and earnings 
management: A combined strategy and auditing paradigm. Accounting Forum, 31(2), 179-201. 
Jaggi, B., & Leung, S. (2007). Impact of family dominance on monitoring of earnings management by 
audit committees: Evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of international accounting, auditing and 
taxation, 16(1), 27-50. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Jiraporn, P., Kim, Y. S., & Davidson III, W. N. (2008). Multiple directorships and corporate 
diversification. Journal of Empirical Finance, 15(3), 418-435. 
Jonas, G. J., & Blanchet, J. (2000). Assessing quality of financial reporting. Accounting Horizons, 14(9), 
353-363. 
Kanagaretnam, K., Lobo, G. J., & Mathieu, R. (2003). Managerial incentives for income smoothing 
through bank loan loss provisions. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 20(1), 63-80. 
Key, K. G. (1997). Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable television industry. 
Journal of accounting and economics, 23(3), 309-337. 
Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal 
of accounting and economics, 33(3), 375-400. 
Koh, P. S. (2003). On the association between institutional ownership and aggressive corporate earnings 
management in Australia. The British Accounting Review, 35(2), 105-128. 
Laux, C., & Laux, V. (2009). Board committees, CEO compensation, and earnings management. The 
Accounting Review, 84(3), 869-891. 





Levitt, A.L. (1998). The Numbers Game: Remarks by Chairman Arthur Levitt to the NYU Centre for 
Law and Business, New York. 
Loomis, C. J. (1999). Lies, damned lies, and managed earnings. Fortune, 140(3), 74-92. 
Macey, J. (1998). Measuring the effectiveness of different corporate governance systems: toward a more 
scientific approach. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 10, 16-25. 
McNichols, M., & Wilson, G. P. (1988). Evidence of earnings management from the provision for bad 
debts. Journal of accounting research, 26, 1-31. 
Mitra, S., & Rodrigue, J. (2002). Discretionary accounting accruals: A methodological issue in earnings 
management research. Journal of Forensic Accounting, 3(2), 185-206. 
Nelson, M. W., Elliott, J. A., & Tarpley, R. L. (2002). Evidence from auditors about managers' and 
auditors' earnings management decisions. Accounting Review, 77(4), 175-202. 
Nelson, M. W., Elliott, J. A., & Tarpley, R. L. (2003). How are earnings managed? Examples from 
auditors. Accounting Horizons, 17, 17-36. 
Nichols, D. C., & Wahlen, J. M. (2004). How do earnings numbers relate to stock returns? A review of 
classic accounting research with updated evidence. Accounting Horizons, 18(4), 263-286. 
OECD. (2004). OECD Countries agree new Corporate Governance Principles. From 
http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_34813_31558102_1_1_1_ 1,00.html. 
Osma, B. G., & Noguer, B. G. A. (2007). The effect of the board composition and its monitoring 
committees on earnings management: Evidence from Spain. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 15(6), 1413-1428. 
Othman, H. B., & Zeghal, D. (2006). A study of earnings-management motives in the Anglo-American 
and Euro-Continental accounting models: The Canadian and French cases. The International 
Journal of Accounting, 41(4), 406-435. 
Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., & Young, S. (2005). Board monitoring and earnings management: do outside 
directors influence abnormal accruals? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(7&8), 
1311-1346. 
Persons, O. S. (2006). Corporate governance and non-financial reporting fraud. The Journal of Business 
and Economic Studies, 12(1), 27-40. 
Qarran, S.S. (2005). Factors affecting income smoothing: a field study of Jordanian manufacturing 
companies, unpublished Master‟ thesis, Yarmouk University, Irbid. 
Rao, N., & Dandale, S. (2008). Earnings Management: A Study of Equity Rights Issues in India. Journal 
of Applied Finance, 14, 20-34. 
Roychowdhury, S. (2006). Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of 
accounting and economics, 42(3), 335-370. 
Saudagaran, S. M. (2003). The Accounting World Post-Enron, Tyco, Vivendi, Worldcom, Xerox...: 
Reflections on Being Part of the Solution. Malaysian Accounting Review, 2(1), 2-12. 
Schipper, K. (1989). Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons, 3(4-5), 91-102. 
Senate of Canada (2003). Navigating through the perfect storm: safeguards to restore investor confidence. 
Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce. The Honorable E. 
Leo Kolber, Chair. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). Large shareholders and corporate control. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 94, 961-988. 
Siregar, S. V., & Utama, S. (2008). Type of earnings management and the effect of ownership structure, 
firm size, and corporate-governance practices: Evidence from Indonesia. The International 
Journal of Accounting, 43(1), 1-27. 
Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., & Wong, T. (1998). Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned 
equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50(1), 63-100. 





Teshima, N., & Shuto, A. (2008). Managerial ownership and earnings management: Theory and empirical 
evidence from Japan. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 19(2), 107-
132. 
Wang, D. (2006). Founding family ownership and earnings quality. Journal of accounting research, 
44(3), 619-656. 
Warfield, T. D., Wild, J. J., & Wild, K. L. (1995). Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and 
informativeness of earnings. Journal of accounting and economics, 20(1), 61-91. 
Watt, R. L., &  Zimmerman J. L. (1986). Positive Accounting Theory: Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prentice-
Hall. 
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1978). Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting 
standards. Accounting Review, 53(1), 112-134. 
Wild, J. J. (1996). The audit committee and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 
11(2), 247-276. 
Williamson, O. E. (1988). Corporate finance and corporate governance. Journal of finance, 43(3), 567-
591. 
Xie, B., Davidson III, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings management and corporate governance: 
the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of corporate finance, 9(3), 295-316. 
Yu, F. F. (2008). Analyst coverage and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(2), 
245-271. 
Zhong, K., Gribbin, D. W., & Zheng, X. (2007). The effect of monitoring by outside blockholders on 
earnings management. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 46(1), 37-60.    
 
 
 
